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Summary
Ever since its announcement in 2013, China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) has attracted significant 
attention from international observers, covering its impact on fields ranging from economic integra-
tion to geopolitics. However, the peace and security implications of the BRI have seen comparatively 
little interest, despite the heavy concentration of BRI-related investments in highly fragile and con-
flict-prone environments. 
As will be shown in this report, Chinese-built infrastructure also has a transformative impact on 
local conflict dynamics in many ways – through the provision of developmental benefits and eco-
nomic opportunities, the manifestation of state power in everyday lives, the abduction of BRI projects 
by local political interests, or securitization measures. Some of these effects are positive, and have 
opened up new development perspectives to countries that would have otherwise found it difficult 
to attract outside investments. Others are negative, and have created new grievances and tensions, 
especially where the benefits and costs of BRI projects are unevenly distributed between groups with 
a history of conflict with each other. The aim of this report is to illustrate the complex relationships 
between BRI investments and local conflict dynamics, and to provide some practical suggestions for 
how outcomes could be improved.
This issue is of urgent relevance, and has only become more so during the early-stage implemen-
tation of the BRI. As projects continue to materialize in conflict environments, Chinese enterprises 
are grappling with how to navigate them. The geopolitical tensions surrounding the BRI have exposed 
member states to external pressure and led to domestic political tugs-of-war. There is a pervasive 
lack of trust in national authorities tasked with implementing the BRI, sometimes paired with suspi-
cions over Chinese influence. Among some groups, resistance against the BRI has turned violent, and 
projects themselves have become targets for militant attacks. Meeting this challenge will be crucial 
for the future of many of these countries, and to the BRI itself.
This report is based on an investigation of four especially conflict-prone BRI member countries: 
Pakistan, Myanmar, Kyrgyzstan and Uganda. All of these countries have experienced severe con-
flicts, sometimes rising to the level of civil wars, and are marked by ongoing political instability. 
Despite these preconditions, which have hampered their access to foreign investments and devel-
opment finance, they were able to secure significant Chinese infrastructure investments through the 
BRI, ranging from a volume of about 2 billion USD in Uganda to more than 30 billion (and counting) 
in Pakistan. We investigated the BRI’s local effects through a mixture of interviews with local experts 
and civil society representatives (mainly conducted online due to the pandemic situation), an analy-
sis of observations in local media, expert and stakeholder publications, and background discussions 
with local and Chinese stakeholders. 
Based on our research, we find that across all four cases, resistance against the BRI in conflict 
states is often the result of planning that is responsive to national-level interests, but less so to the 
concerns of regional and local communities. Benefits tend to cluster among elites and already-privi-
leged groups, with disadvantaged communities at risk of being left further behind. Accordingly, en-
suring broader acceptance and success of the BRI in such environments hinges on better outreach 
to local communities, strengthening conflict sensitivity, improving project transparency, and offering 
adequate solutions for adverse effects on local livelihoods. While far from a complete investigation, 
this report is intended as a first step towards a larger research program aimed at studying the BRI’s 
effects on conflict-affected states, and as a demonstration of this question’s relevance. It is also a 
call for greater cooperation from all sides – Chinese, local and international actors – to ensure a bet-
ter BRI implementation, which is in their shared long-term interest
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1. the BrI: Between gloBal amBItIonS and loCal ImplementatIonS
Officially launched in 2013 under the name “One Belt, One Road”, the BRI has since emerged as the 
world’s most prominent infrastructure initiative. The original vision reflected in the name was to up-
grade China’s transport links with the world by constructing a new land-based corridor across Eurasia 
(the “Silk Road Economic Belt”) and a string of port facilities around the Indian Ocean (the “Maritime 
Silk Road”). While these descriptions serve to conjure up romantic images of daring traders exploring 
new commercial opportunities, the BRI has by now evolved into a vast, immensely complex array of 
projects whose scope is difficult to capture. The original, connectivity-centric effort has become a 
worldwide platform for infrastructure projects that are often compartmentalized and scattered be-
tween dozens of sectors. To give just a few examples that will be covered in this report, prominent 
BRI projects have included a vast new port in Pakistan, a hydroelectric dam in Myanmar, mining op-
erations in Kyrgyzstan, and road-building in Uganda. 
This diversity is mainly due to the BRI’s conceptualization as an open platform to which many 
different actors can attach their projects, and has resulted in a situation where there is no clear 
definition of a ‘BRI project’. In practice, the term can be used to cover any infrastructure project lo-
cated in a country that has officially signed on to the BRI, and that is either funded or constructed by 
Chinese actors (usually both). This is also the approach we took for this report, in order to include 
as much material and data as possible. This definition makes it easier to offer an idea of the BRI’s 
overall scope, which is otherwise highly contested. Using this method, and recent data from the Chi-
na Global Investment Tracker (CGIT, Scissors 2019), results in an aggregate estimate of about 351 
billion USD of Chinese infrastructure construction investments in BRI countries since the time of their 
joining – a staggering figure, despite other estimates going into the trillions.1
No matter how widely the net is cast, it is clear that in many countries across the globe, China has 
become the most important provider of infrastructure. As we will show, Chinese agency in this field 
is marked by a very high risk acceptance, enabling a move into areas that had been underserved by 
other international actors like the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank or Western development 
agencies. One of the key ideas that influenced the conceptualization of the BRI was the diagnosis of 
a massive “infrastructure gap” in developing countries that held back local development and glo bal 
economic growth, with the unfulfilled demand estimated at up to 500 billion USD a year (Lin/Wang 
2013). In offering to plug this gap, China could leverage its strengths in infrastructure development, 
while simultaneously exporting domestic overcapacities in this sector and triggering a new stage in 
the ‘going out’ process of Chinese enterprises. 
However, in the eyes of international observers, the BRI soon attained a far greater significance 
than just an economic or developmental measure. Due to its close association with the person of Xi 
Jinping, and his pursuit of a much more ambitious Chinese foreign policy (Yan 2014), perceptions 
1   Our estimate is based on CGIT data updated throughout the end of 2020, and limited to construction investments 
across four sectors relevant to infrastructure (transport, energy, utilities and telecom).
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quickly focused on its potential geopolitical impact. Even before most of its projects had gotten un-
derway, observers – especially in the US – began to wonder if the main intention behind the BRI was 
to transform the vast landmass of Eurasia into a kind of Chinese ‘hinterland’, using the enormous 
pull of China’s market to draw smaller countries into its orbit – first economically, and then politically 
(Fallon 2015; Ferdinand 2016). This assumption has continued to dominate Western perceptions of 
the BRI – and motivated much of the resistance against it, resulting in a situation where Italy is the 
only major Western nation that has officially signed up to the initiative. To date, the most prominent 
Western analyses on the BRI continue to focus on geopolitical aspects, e.g. as a long-term attempt to 
build an alternative world order by continuing the liberal program of economic openness while seek-
ing to undermine its political dimension (Rolland 2017). Others have focused more on the traditional 
meaning of ‘geopolitics ’ and how the BRI is intended to transform strategic spaces, stretching from 
China’s restive western regions to the Eurasian frontier (Markey 2020). As more evidence from actual 
implementation on the ground becomes available, recent studies have also covered the tensions be-
tween Chinese strategic objectives and local realities in the diverse settings that have become part 
of the BRI (Hillman 2020).
These perceptions cannot be easily dismissed. After all, a major reason why the BRI received 
such an enthusiastic reception among Chinese IR theorists was precisely because it heralded a new 
stage in China’s development, in which the country would move from selectively adapting to an ex-
isting global order to actively reshaping it (Swaine 2015). In a very literal sense, Chinese-built roads 
and bridges would create new pathways for human interactions across Eurasia and Africa, and as 
the point where all of these lines converged, their country would (re-)emerge as the political center of 
the world. These expectations have been steadily encouraged by Xi Jinping himself, who has made 
it clear that the BRI is central to his vision of moving China back towards the “center stage” of inter-
national politics (China Daily 2017). However, something that has gotten lost among the focus on the 
BRI’s strategic purposes and geopolitical impact is that the vast majority of announced and complet-
ed projects will most immediately affect the lives of people in their local environment. Governments 
across Asia and Africa have not signed up to it primarily because of a desire to forge closer ties with 
China, but because they believe Chinese-provided infrastructure offers them the best chance to fulfill 
their own national development priorities.
Projects that are eventually constructed are not drawn up in a central headquarters in Beijing, 
but are the result of complex interactions between local political actors, their constituencies, Chi-
nese funding agencies and contractors. While ‘China’ is often seen as a monolithic entity, the im-
mense scope of the BRI and its openness have attracted a highly diverse set of actors just on this 
side alone. This includes a large number of government agencies, primarily the National Develop-
ment and Reform Commission (NDRC, the leading economic planning agency) and the ministries 
of commerce and foreign affairs, provincial and even city-level governments; a host of national 
and multilateral funding vehicles, from the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and a 
dedicated “Silk Road Fund” (SRF) to the existing Chinese policy banks (China Development Bank 
and China Exim Bank); a mixture of both state-owned and private Chinese enterprises seeking 
commercial opportunities in project construction; advisors drawn from the ranks of think tanks 
and academia; state-affiliated and private organizations engaged in various forms of international 
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networking and promotion; and finally, a vast number of ordinary people who have been drawn to 
the opportunities promised by the BRI.
In the countries that have signed up for the BRI, they engage with an even more eclectic mix of 
local political, economic and social actors, who seek to enlist the initiative to the pursuit of their own 
interests, which are frequently at odds with each other. As a result, projects need to be renegotiated 
as the political winds in target countries shift and priorities are reevaluated. This is an especially 
acute problem in the countries covered here, which have frequently experienced outbreaks of vio-
lence, political instability, tenuous institutional arrangements, and sometimes international conflicts 
with other states. Sometimes, this results in projects that have little in common with the original 
pitch, or even outright abandonment. This report seeks to take these factors into account and to add 
more nuance to global perceptions of the BRI, showing how it is localized in highly challenging envi-
ronments and in turn transforms them.
2. ControverSIeS, ConCernS and ConflICt rISkS
Aside from the perception of the BRI as a geopolitical project to carve out a Chinese-dominated 
sphere of interest in the developing world, criticism has usually focused on several specific features 
of Chinese-built infrastructure and the financing behind it. These will be briefly summarized here, fol-
lowed by a set of initial assumptions on how these issues in turn relate to conflicts.
One of the earliest such criticisms focused on the existing environmental sustainability track re-
cord of Chinese infrastructure projects, raising concerns over the expansion of CO2-emitting energy 
generation and industries, the reorientation of water resources and loss of livelihoods for local resi-
dents, a loss of biodiversity and proliferation of invasive species, and the degradation of ecosystems 
as a result of construction activity (Ascensão et al. 2018). These issues were also among the first 
to be acknowledged by the Chinese government, which in 2019 rolled out a comprehensive agenda 
aimed at “greening” the BRI and increasing attention to environmental issues in project funding. All 
key BRI funding organizations have by now committed to upholding these principles (Jahns et al. 
2020). However, due to the decentralized nature of the BRI, capacity limitations among supervising 
institutions, and inconsistent environmental regulations across recipient countries, the actual, wide-
spread implementation of such standards remains elusive (Hale/Liu/Urpelainen 2020).
Additionally, while one of the BRI’s stated aims is to kickstart local industrial development, the 
direct economic benefits arising from its construction and sometimes also operation are restricted 
to a small number of overwhelmingly Chinese contractors, most of them state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs). According to the deputy director of China’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administra-
tion Commission (SASAC), they account for more than 80% of the volume of BRI investments (China 
Daily 2019). A common complaint is that bidding processes are closed or opaque, systematically 
locking out international competitors (EUCCC 2020). Domestic enterprises in developing countries 
are rarely if ever considered for implementation, usually with the argument that they lack the techni-
cal know-how to do so; and whatever immediate employment opportunities are created for locals are 
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almost exclusively in low-skilled, low-paid and temporary positions (Russell/Berger 2019). Some BRI 
projects, like a major railway expansion in Ethiopia, now include extensive training schemes for local 
staff at Chinese colleges (Chen 2020), but the effects remain yet to be seen.
The financing of BRI projects has similarly emerged as a highly contentious topic. Despite being 
mostly commercial in nature rather than coming as aid, its concentration in infrastructure projects 
puts it in direct competition with international development finance, which often requires recipients 
to commit to economic and political reforms (Dollar 2018). Chinese loans, on the other hand, are 
advertised as coming with “no strings attached”, buttressed by China’s official stance of noninterven-
tion in the domestic politics of other states. Accordingly, the proliferation of BRI-related loans and 
Chinese development finance has been seen as weakening the standards set by Western regimes 
and reducing reform pressure on states that do not comply with them (Brautigam 2009; Benabdallah 
2016).
The ability to tap into Chinese capital has also resulted in a drastic increase in the debt levels of 
many member countries, giving rise to worries about the sustainability of these arrangements. Ac-
cording to a World Bank estimate, a third of recipient countries are expected to experience increased 
debt vulnerability as a result of the structure of their BRI arrangements (Bandiera/Tsiropoulos 2019). 
Some analysts have even accused China of engaging in so-called “debt-trap diplomacy” – willfully 
extending loans that it knows creditors will default on, only to use the necessary restructuring or 
forgiveness to increase its political influence over them. These charges are exaggerated and ignore 
both the agency of local political actors as well as more innocent explanations for the failure rate 
of Chinese loans, like a greater willingness to take risks and lack of experience with local context 
conditions (Acker/Brautigam/Huang 2020). But debt sustainability is another problematic aspect 
of the BRI, especially since defaults can have significant disruptive effects on local economies and 
societies.
In highlighting the agency of national political leaders in recipient countries, counterpoints to the 
‘debt trap’ narrative have also raised another problematic issue. Major decisions on BRI projects and 
entire development plans are predominantly made at the bilateral governmental level, and with little 
input from local governments and civil society groups that are the most acutely affected by them. 
National leaders have been highly successful in pitching projects whose overall viability is dubious, 
but deliver concentrated benefits for themselves or key allies and constituencies. The story of the 
Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, which originally triggered the ‘debt trap’ narrative, is a case in point 
for this (Ferchen/Perera 2019). In countries like Pakistan, the results of high-level negotiations ulti-
mately led to domestic disputes over resource-sharing, exacerbated tensions between the center and 
periphery, and led to strongly diverging views of the BRI among economic elites and disadvantaged 
groups (Markey 2020).
Assessing the viability of BRI projects and rejecting unconvincing pitches is supposed to be done 
at the level of funding organizations, but this is not always handled consistently. In practice, only 
the flagship AIIB has the necessary independence and capacities to do thorough reviews and act on 
them, while policy banks and the SRF are lacking in this regard (Hale/Liu/Urpelainen 2020). More-
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over, they are directly overseen by the Chinese government (or in the case of the SRF, the central 
bank), tasked with supporting its political objectives and will follow its guidance on projects that are 
seen to deliver strategic or diplomatic benefits for China (Rudyak 2020).
Finally, the predominantly Chinese companies tasked with constructing BRI projects in fragile 
contexts find themselves operating in complex environments with which they have had little previ-
ous experience. In making sense of this environment, and their own role within it, they face a major 
challenge in lacking capacities on conflict sensitivity, and have been slow to embrace general Corpo-
rate Social Responsibility (CSR) standards (Tan-Mullins 2014). This is exacerbated by China’s strong 
commitment to noninterference in the political affairs of other countries, which discourages Chinese 
companies from even seeing themselves as (political) actors in these local contexts. As a result, they 
often remain aloof and isolated from local communities, communicate little information about their 
objectives and tasks, and lack channels to take up local concerns (Jafri 2020).
These issues are well known, but how they play out specifically in conflict settings is an issue 
that has received little systematic attention, despite the many existing studies on the BRI. However, 
across the potential environmental, developmental, financial or social impacts, a common thread 
is that the benefits and costs of the BRI are often unevenly distributed in recipient countries. While 
the influx of resources associated with BRI membership may indeed be a boon and make a positive 
contribution to local development, the precise distribution of benefits among different groups likely 
matters a great deal for the overall impact. In countries that have already experienced significant 
conflicts, tensions may well be exacerbated as a result of diverging perceptions of projects and their 
benefits.
3. the BrI In ConflICt envIronmentS: general patternS
Figure 1 plots total Chinese infrastructure construction investments in BRI countries against their 
conflict proneness, using the abovementioned statistics from the China Global Investment Tracker 
for the former and the “cohesion” dimension of the State Fragility Index (SFI) as a proxy for the latter. 
The plotted number is the sum total of all such investments in a country since it joined the BRI, updat-
ed until the end of 2020.2 This may include projects already agreed prior to the onset of the BRI, but 
due to the vague, open nature of the initiative is arguably the most reasonable criterion for inclusion. 
Figures for state cohesion use the most recent (2020) edition of the SFI, as these do not tend to vary 
much over time.3
2   Figures are limited to construction investments across four sectors relevant to infrastructure (transport, energy, util-
ities and telecom).
3   The ‘cohesion ’ dimension was chosen because it reflects direct conflict risks and measures of ongoing conflict, rath-
er than economic and political grievances that are seen as risk factors in their outbreak. The plotted figure is the sum 
of its three sub-indicators (“Security Apparatus”, “Factionalized Elites” and “Group Grievance”), with higher numbers 
reflecting higher levels of conflict proneness.
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The figure sketches the overall bivariate correlation, an estimate of the linear relationship provided 
by the regression line, and labels cases that have attracted particularly high investments (more than 
10 billion USD in total). As these indicators show, Chinese infrastructure investments under the BRI 
are clearly skewed towards environments with high levels of conflict risk. Purely from a risk manage-
ment viewpoint, this appears counterintuitive: infrastructure investments have very long amortization 
periods, and are highly vulnerable to wartime destruction as well as lesser political risks like expro-
priation or drastic revisions to existing contracts. Accordingly, we would expect capital to flock to 
environments that exhibit long-term stability, but the opposite is clearly the case for the BRI.
Some of this is by design – after all, the BRI was specifically intended to alleviate an unmet de-
mand for infrastructure across developing countries in Asia and Africa that had at least been partially 
caused by their often unattractive risk profiles (Deloitte 2019). There is an element of path depen-
dence, too: the BRI built on decades of prior Chinese engagement with many of its members, often 
centered around natural resource extraction to fuel China’s booming economy. As China is an indus-
trial latecomer, these usually had to be acquired in fragile states where Western corporations feared 
to tread (Alden/Alves 2009). Another reason can be found in the BRI’s perception as a geopolitical 
project designed to further Chinese global influence, which caused the US and many of its allies to 
abstain from participation and discourage it in others (Ekman et al. 2019). This opposition removed 
many of the world’s wealthiest and most politically stable nations from the pool of potential mem-
bers, leaving it skewed towards more fragile countries.
While any sort of foreign direct investment (FDI) would be considered a boon for capital-deprived 
countries, the specific form which BRI-related inflows took often turned out to be much more con-
Fig. 1: Chinese infrastructure investments under the BRI by recipient state conflict proneness. Data 
Source: SFI 2020 and CGIT (Scissors 2019).
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troversial. As we will show with our subsequent case studies, this was often related to underappre-
ciated political aspects of infrastructure – its relation to grand visions of national development, its 
association with specific local political interests, an uneven distribution of costs and benefits, and 
often a lack of community engagement despite the deeply transformative impact projects will have 
on local residents.
4. “all-weather” frIendS and loCal enmItIeS: the BrI In pakIStan
Pakistan was one of the first countries to sign up to the BRI and is home to its ‘flagship’ project, the 
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The history of CPEC in Pakistan, and its many interactions 
with local conflict environments and politics, is long and complex – in fact, one of its main features, 
and the reason why it was described as a ‘corridor’, predates the BRI by more than a decade. The idea 
to develop the coastal town of Gwadar in Balochistan into an international port and trade hub was al-
ready pitched to China by then-president Pervez Musharraf in 2001, who was able to overcome initial 
skepticism and eventually secured a funding and construction agreement (Markey 2020).
Despite these early warning signs, Islamabad was eventually able to pitch an even grander de-
sign to its Chinese counterparts, taking advantage of Xi Jinping’s appetite for bold foreign policy 
moves and nascent vision for the BRI. In 2013, the newly-elected PML-N government of Prime Min-
ister Nawaz Sharif reached an agreement in principle on an economic corridor running from Gwadar 
to the Chinese border. The port itself, intermittently managed by the Singapore Port Authority, would 
once again be run by China; it would be designated as the terminus of a new road, rail and telecom 
link running all the way to the Chinese border; a dozen new power plants were to address Pakistan’s 
chronic energy shortfall; and once the groundwork had been laid, new business parks along the corri-
dor would jumpstart Pakistan’s industrialization (Small 2020). With the exception of several projects 
in Gwadar, this was to be financed by Chinese commercial loans at undisclosed interest rates.
Coming on the heels of an economic crisis, as well as the US drawing down its counterterrorism 
campaigns and the attendant aid, the PML-N government hailed CPEC as a “game changer” for Pakis-
tan. It was sold not as a mundane infrastructure program, but as a nation-building and development 
scheme that would enable all regions of Pakistan to share in the benefits of modernity and globali-
zation (Ahmed 2019; Hameed 2018). Similarly, it was advertised as proof of the “all-weather friend-
ship” between Beijing and Islamabad, encouraging the perception that China was robustly backing 
Pakistan in its conflict with India out of strategic concerns (Markey 2020). This campaign, and the 
enthusiastic reactions it generated, also helped to convince Beijing that Pakistan was exceptionally 
friendly territory for the BRI, and worth committing a major share of its resources to (Afzal 2020).
Reality would turn out to be much more complicated as soon as CPEC moved from early vi-
sions to the stage of concrete projects. Inside Pakistan, conflicts erupted over three key aspects 
of CPEC: the distribution of its projects, the location of decision-making authority, and the lack of 
transparency over the content of specific agreements. All of these sprang from long-running prob-
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lems with Pakis tan’s political and administrative systems, yet had not been anticipated and appar-
ently came as a shock to the Chinese (Small 2020).
Center-periphery tensions are a long-running issue in Pakistani politics, owing to its status as a 
multiethnic state whose largest group, the Punjabis, have historically dominated politics, state agen-
cies and the security establishment (Waseem 2011). CPEC-related conflicts can be traced to the 
same fault line, and originally developed over the routing question. In the early negotiation phase, 
the project had been illustrated with a map showing a transit corridor from Gwadar through Baloch-
istan, Khyber-Pakthunkhwa and Gilgit-Baltistan, i.e. Pakistan’s lesser-developed western periphery. In 
2014–2015, however, it emerged that there was little Chinese interest in this route, due to the lack of 
existing infrastructure and the severe insurgent problem in these areas. Leaks that the central gov-
ernment was now exploring an ‘eastern route’ through better-developed areas in Punjab and Sindh 
triggered fierce opposition from constituencies along the ‘western route’ (Shah 2015). In 2015, an 
all-party conference signed off on a compromise that replaced the single corridor with three north-
south arteries and several lateral connections (Noorani 2016). However, most of the promised roads 
in the West had not in fact been included in the CPEC portfolio and are yet to begin construction or 
even receive the necessary funding commitments (Aamir 2019). This caused widespread feelings 
of betrayal among the concerned communities and a dramatic loss of trust in central authorities.4
Another CPEC priority, the amelioration of Pakistan’s chronic energy deficit through new power 
plants, caused similar misgivings. While ten plants became operational from 2015–2020, adding a 
total of about 5,500 MW capacity,5 these benefits were again unevenly distributed. With one excep-
tion, the plants finished so far are located entirely in Punjab and Sindh, and the single plant technically 
located in Balochistan is actually on the outskirts of Karachi. An even bigger issue is the dramatic 
difference in transmission grid capacity between the provinces, which has so far enabled mainly 
consumers in the developed eastern parts of Pakistan to enjoy CPEC’s benefits, while grids in Pa-
kistan’s western regions are too outdated, disconnected and sparse to actually deliver this load to 
local households.6 Local politicians and activists raised concerns over this imbalance, but have so 
far been unable to get local grid upgrades on the CPEC-approved list.
When mapping out projects that have been completed or begun construction using geolocation 
data (figure 2), both the connectivity gaps in the proposed ‘western route’ and the heavy concentra-
tion of power plants in eastern and southern industrial centers are immediately apparent. So far, the 
main beneficiaries of CPEC’s early stage are Pakistan’s comparatively highly developed areas, while 
its periphery is at risk of being left even further behind.
4   Interviews with a former adviser to the government of Khyber-Pakhthunkwa, November 22, 2020, and a Baloch poli-
tician, November 26, 2020.
5   Based on information on energy projects provided by the Pakistani government’s official CPEC portal (http://cpec.
gov.pk/energy).
6   Interviews with a former adviser to the government of Khyber-Pakhthunkwa, November 22, 2020, and a Baloch poli-
tician, November 26, 2020.
Fig. 2:  CPEC’s eastern skew – geographic location of connectivity (yellow) and power plant (blue) 
projects within Pakistan; right side: overlaid on district-level HDI data. Author’s compilation of project 
location data obtained from the CSIS Reconnecting Asia database (CSIS 2019), restricted to projects 
that are marked as ‘completed’ or ‘under construction’. HDI data obtained from Najam and Bari (2017).
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lems with Pakis tan’s political and administrative systems, yet had not been anticipated and appar-
ently came as a shock to the Chinese (Small 2020).
Center-periphery tensions are a long-running issue in Pakistani politics, owing to its status as a 
multiethnic state whose largest group, the Punjabis, have historically dominated politics, state agen-
cies and the security establishment (Waseem 2011). CPEC-related conflicts can be traced to the 
same fault line, and originally developed over the routing question. In the early negotiation phase, 
the project had been illustrated with a map showing a transit corridor from Gwadar through Baloch-
istan, Khyber-Pakthunkhwa and Gilgit-Baltistan, i.e. Pakistan’s lesser-developed western periphery. In 
2014–2015, however, it emerged that there was little Chinese interest in this route, due to the lack of 
existing infrastructure and the severe insurgent problem in these areas. Leaks that the central gov-
ernment was now exploring an ‘eastern route’ through better-developed areas in Punjab and Sindh 
triggered fierce opposition from constituencies along the ‘western route’ (Shah 2015). In 2015, an 
all-party conference signed off on a compromise that replaced the single corridor with three north-
south arteries and several lateral connections (Noorani 2016). However, most of the promised roads 
in the West had not in fact been included in the CPEC portfolio and are yet to begin construction or 
even receive the necessary funding commitments (Aamir 2019). This caused widespread feelings 
of betrayal among the concerned communities and a dramatic loss of trust in central authorities.4
Another CPEC priority, the amelioration of Pakistan’s chronic energy deficit through new power 
plants, caused similar misgivings. While ten plants became operational from 2015–2020, adding a 
total of about 5,500 MW capacity,5 these benefits were again unevenly distributed. With one excep-
tion, the plants finished so far are located entirely in Punjab and Sindh, and the single plant technically 
located in Balochistan is actually on the outskirts of Karachi. An even bigger issue is the dramatic 
difference in transmission grid capacity between the provinces, which has so far enabled mainly 
consumers in the developed eastern parts of Pakistan to enjoy CPEC’s benefits, while grids in Pa-
kistan’s western regions are too outdated, disconnected and sparse to actually deliver this load to 
local households.6 Local politicians and activists raised concerns over this imbalance, but have so 
far been unable to get local grid upgrades on the CPEC-approved list.
When mapping out projects that have been completed or begun construction using geolocation 
data (figure 2), both the connectivity gaps in the proposed ‘western route’ and the heavy concentra-
tion of power plants in eastern and southern industrial centers are immediately apparent. So far, the 
main beneficiaries of CPEC’s early stage are Pakistan’s comparatively highly developed areas, while 
its periphery is at risk of being left even further behind.
4   Interviews with a former adviser to the government of Khyber-Pakhthunkwa, November 22, 2020, and a Baloch poli-
tician, November 26, 2020.
5   Based on information on energy projects provided by the Pakistani government’s official CPEC portal (http://cpec.
gov.pk/energy).
6   Interviews with a former adviser to the government of Khyber-Pakhthunkwa, November 22, 2020, and a Baloch poli-
tician, November 26, 2020.
Fig. 2:  CPEC’s eastern skew – geographic location of connectivity (yellow) and power plant (blue) 
projects within Pakistan; right side: overlaid on district-level HDI data. Author’s compilation of project 
location data obtained from the CSIS Reconnecting Asia database (CSIS 2019), restricted to projects 
that are marked as ‘completed’ or ‘under construction’. HDI data obtained from Najam and Bari (2017).
In response to these concerns, seeking to stabilize CPEC’s security environment and to rebuild a na-
tionwide consensus around it, China and its domestic partners deployed a variety of tools that can be 
sorted into two strategies. The first of these was centered on security measures and had a short-term 
focus, while the second constituted broader political outreach.
Security concerns and countermeasures featured prominently in CPEC planning, mainly in re-
sponse to a history of insurgent attacks on Chinese construction crews. In order to secure CPEC 
against this threat, Pakistan’s military set up a “Special Security Division” of 15,000 troops in 2016, 
soon after joined by a special naval detachment to protect Gwadar (Khan 2016). These forces were 
deployed mainly in the western regions but made up of units drawn from Punjab and Sindh (Sial 
2016), which soon became another point of tension with local citizens and authorities.7 In addition to 
government forces, several Chinese private security contractors are advertising services in Pakistan, 
despite an official ban on such activities (Legarda/Nouwens 2018).
Ultimately, this securitization strategy also had a political impact as Pakistan’s military became 
increasingly involved in project selection and implementation. This reflected another familiar fault 
line in Pakistani politics – the struggle between civilian and military authorities (Waseem 2011). Here, 
the government turnover in 2018 was a watershed moment: incoming premier Imran Khan’s previous 
criticism of CPEC had caused a delay in the program and undermined Chinese confidence in Pakis-
tan’s civilian authorities. While Khan’s new government eventually embraced the initiative, it took the 
7   Interview with a Baloch politician, November 26, 2020.
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visit of a high-ranking general to Beijing to get CPEC back on track,8 while Beijing also increasingly 
turned to the military, the only Pakistani institution it saw as internally stable, effective and complete-
ly committed to CPEC.9
Where the PML-N government had still insisted on civilian control over CPEC, its successor also 
proved more willing to entertain the military’s economic and strategic ambitions.10 This eventually 
led to the centralization of CPEC planning under a new “CPEC Authority” (CPECA) in October 2019, 
headed by retired general Asim Bajwa, and following a model the army had proposed in 2016 (Boni/
Adeney 2020). This involvement has generated fresh concerns over CPEC-related corruption – Bajwa 
himself was soon after implicated in a personal corruption scandal and had to resign as adviser to 
the president, but continues in his CPECA function (Shahid 2020). Even more worrisome is that CPE-
CA was established by executive decree and lacked parliamentary authorization for the initial period 
of its operation, which was only belatedly established in November 2020 (Haider 2020). It is unclear 
whether Beijing had actively pushed for this reorganization, but it certainly welcomed it after its initial 
experiences with the Khan government.11
The second strategy was political in nature, signaling a gradual weakening of China’s official prin-
ciple of noninterference. In the planning stage, Chinese diplomats engaged in outreach to opposition 
parties, seeking to counter perceptions of CPEC as a ‘PML-N pet project’ and to insulate it against 
future government turnovers (Small 2020). Chinese negotiators were somewhat willing to alter the 
subnational distribution of CPEC projects and, for example, agreed to an even number of proposed 
industrial parks for all provinces (Hussain/Rao 2020).
A second element was civil society outreach, targeted specifically at groups that were opposed to 
CPEC. In Balochistan, local politicians and journalists were invited on tours of China, showcasing its 
own successful modernization and portraying it as a friend to all of Pakistan. However, according to 
one participant, these attempts fell completely flat because they followed a general image-building 
template rather than addressing the actual issues of concern to Baloch communities.12
Third, China intensified its exchanges with Pakistan’s policy community, setting up discussion 
fora, research-sharing channels and even entire new think tanks (Abb 2016). However, these suffered 
from the problem that policy elites in Islamabad are also predominantly recruited from the Punjabi 
majority and predisposed to be positive towards CPEC. Critics from other provinces either found 
themselves outright excluded from such gatherings or left with little confidence that their input was 
8   Interview with a journalist based in Balochistan, November 20, 2020.
9   Interview with an academic expert on CPEC, October 28, 2020.
10   Interview with a Pakistani expert on civil-military relations, November 16, 2020.
11   Interview with a Pakistani expert on civil-military relations, November 16, 2020.
12   Interview with a journalist based in Balochistan, November 20, 2020.
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taken seriously.13 The Chinese preference for tight political control over its domestic policy commu-
nity and highly scripted discussions likely also undermined the effectiveness of such channels.
Fourth and finally, China and Pakistan waged a joint information campaign to promote CPEC, 
touting its developmental and strategic benefits, which however tended to delegitimize any domestic 
criticism of the project by connecting it to Pakistan’s external enemies (Afzal 2020).
The political strategy achieved a major success in bringing the Khan government on board with 
CPEC, which arguably established the broadest domestic elite consensus since its onset. Among 
ordinary Pakistani citizens, China also continues to enjoy a highly positive image and a great deal of 
trust (Pew Research 2015), while the activities of Chinese companies there received a 63% appro-
val in a Chinese survey, far higher than the 44% average in a sample of BRI countries (Sina Finance 
2020). Crucially, with the exception of some separatist groups in Balochistan, CPEC critics do not 
disagree with the project as a whole, but in fact often want a bigger piece of it. The failure to achieve 
a more equitable distribution is mainly blamed on authorities in Islamabad and the shortcomings of 
Pakistan’s own political system.14
However, the longer CPEC’s benefits are withheld from already marginalized groups, the more 
likely it is that their opposition will turn fundamental. Within Balochistan, the narrative that China is a 
neocolonial, exploitative actor is gaining ground and being used as a recruitment tool for insurgent 
groups (Kovrig 2018). The most desirable connectivity and electricity projects have been irrevocably 
assigned to Punjab and Sindh provinces, while Pakistan’s periphery is set to lose out, and this struc-
tural disadvantage will continue to hamper follow-on plans for industrial parks (Hussain/Rao 2020; 
Small 2020), further exacerbating subnational developmental differences. Accordingly, CPEC’s na-
tion-building ambitions have failed so far, as Baloch and Pashtu grievances against the center have 
intensified further.
Engagement at the grassroots level has also produced few tangible results: many local citizens 
in the immediate vicinity of projects see Chinese companies as aloof and either ignorant of or indif-
ferent to their concerns (Jafri 2020). CSR efforts are nonexistent in the vast majority of settings, and 
where they have been attempted – like a project to provide schooling for children in Gwadar – are per-
ceived as inadequate.15 As mentioned above, stakeholder outreach has also been mostly ineffective.
CPEC’s security strategy has likewise delivered mixed results. In general, insurgent violence in 
Pakistan decreased markedly over the last few years, including CPEC-relevant areas; however, a hard 
core of Baloch separatists and Islamists continue to target Chinese projects.16 Just in the last two 
13   Interviews with a former adviser to the government of Khyber-Pakhthunkwa, November 22, 2020, and an adviser to 
the government of Balochistan, December 2, 2020.
14   Interviews with an academic expert on CPEC, November 5, 2020; a Pakistani think tank expert, October 30, 2020; and 
an adviser to the government of Balochistan, December 2, 2020.
15   Interview with an adviser to the Balochistan provincial government, December 2, 2020.
16   Interviews with an academic expert on CPEC, November 5, 2020.
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years, the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) carried out attacks against a hotel in Gwadar and the 
Chinese consulate and China-built stock exchange in Karachi, each resulting in multiple fatalities. 
This campaign has hampered the construction of CPEC and forced drastic limits on the movement 
of Chinese nationals in Pakistan (Aamir 2018).
The measures introduced to safeguard CPEC have further alienated local communities especially 
in high-security zones like Gwadar, where multiple layers of checkpoints limit the movement of locals 
and are perceived as harassment.17 They have also significantly inhibited the sea access of local 
fisher men and resulted in a loss of livelihoods, without creating new employment opportunities.18 All 
of this has created a sense of disconnect from local communities and bolstered the narrative that 
CPEC is a neocolonial project designed by outsiders seeking to exploit the people of Balochistan.
Apart from its social costs, the tight security regime has also added to Pakistan’s financial bur-
den, and will have to be borne by consumers with an extra tax on electricity (Kiani 2017). Most seri-
ously, however, it has further strengthened the role of the military in Pakistani politics. This creates 
several other problems – obviously the lack of democratic legitimation and public accountability, but 
also a blow to constitutionally mandated devolution (Boni/Adeney 2020) and the further escalation 
of center-periphery tensions, as the military is seen as especially dominated by Punjabi elites.
The history of CPEC in Pakistan shows the degree to which BRI outcomes on the ground are de-
termined by a complex interplay of local and Chinese interests, and presented the latter with tough 
choices between economic viability, strategic designs, satisfying local political elites and managing 
security concerns. Some local elites – primarily the PML-N government, allied business elites, and 
later on the military – were highly successful in putting their own imprint on CPEC, while others, es-
pecially minorities in Pakistan’s western regions, fared much worse, exacerbating conflicts between 
these groups (Hameed 2018). This localization or even abduction played out not just in project selec-
tion, but also the shaping of expectations and the greater narrative surrounding CPEC. Here, the hype 
generated in the planning stage generated expectations that profit-oriented Chinese investments 
could not possibly measure up to.
Despite its overall friendly ties to China, Pakistan’s difficult political terrain and existing conflicts 
ended up posing a significant challenge, which Chinese actors arguably underestimated. Chinese en-
terprises entering the country lacked conflict management capabilities or even detailed information 
about the local situation, and official guidelines urge them to refrain from any action that could be 
construed as political interference (MOFCOM 2019). Active engagement on all of these fronts would 
have helped to avoid entanglement in conflicts, improved expectations management and probably 
saved costs compared to the existing security arrangements.
17   Interview with a journalist based in Balochistan, November 20, 2020.
18   Interviews with a Baloch politician, November 26, 2020, and with an adviser to the Balochistan provincial govern-
ment, December 2, 2020.
ROAD TO PEACE OR BONE OF CONTENTION? 13
5. CooperatIon through ComplexIty: myanmar and the BrI 
Myanmar’s transition from military rule towards democracy came to an abrupt end on 1 February 
2021 when the armed forces (Tatmadaw) seized power. The takeover has thrusted China on to cen-
ter stage of a major internal political crisis with tense international implications – despite officially 
denying any prior knowledge of the Tatmadaw’s intentions (Myanmar Times 2021). By declaring a 
state of national emergency, the military seizure of power effectively put an end to the political trans-
formation and gradual liberalization that had begun during the 2010s following the re-introduction 
of multi-party elections. The February 2021 arrest and detention of National League for Democracy 
(NLD) leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and other party representatives, has led to a widespread ‘civil 
disobedience’ movement (CDM) across the country (BBC 2021).
Aside from the political unrest that has followed the military seizure of power, a multitude of 
subnational conflicts still dominate Myanmar’s political landscape, with areas often controlled by 
the Tatmadaw, paramilitary groups, or ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), as well as with zones of 
‘mixed authority’.
China has been Myanmar’s most prominent international investor, as well as defense and diplo-
matic ally, since the late 1980s. However, during the early 2010s relations between the two countries 
temporarily soured when several China-backed projects, including the Myitsone hydropower project, 
were suspended (Gong 2020). Following accusations of state-sponsored violence against the Ro-
hingya people in Rakhine State in 2017, the western international community strongly condemned 
the government of Myanmar’s handling of the situation and began to withdraw program funding and 
investments. As a result, the prospect of Myanmar transitioning away from its economic reliance 
on China rapidly faded, with Naypyitaw reverting back to a ‘look east’ economic policy (Lwin 2019).
Under the leadership of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar signed a memorandum of understand-
ing with China to join the BRI in 2018, an avenue through which Beijing sought to bolster the two 
countries’ bilateral economic relations. Ahead of a state visit to Myanmar in January 2020, President 
Xi Jinping spoke of the two countries’ “Paukphaw” friendship, using the Burmese language word for 
‘fraternal’ to invoke a symbolic sense of cultural cooperation and historical connection between the 
two countries (Liu 2020). In January 2021, during a visit to Myanmar, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang 
Yi urged progress on key BRI projects, especially the construction of the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port 
and the Mandalay-Kyaukphyu Railway.
China has invested billions of dollars in Myanmar over many decades and remains the country’s 
biggest trading partner and main source of FDI, with a focus on hydropower, oil and gas, and mining 
(Lwin 2019). BRI projects exist as part of the strategically important China-Myanmar Economic Corri-
dor (CMEC), which consists of a number of infrastructure projects aimed at supporting connectivity 
between Myanmar, China and the surrounding region.
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Official CMEC projects include road and rail transportation links from China’s Yunnan Province 
through Muse and Mandalay to Kyaukphyu, where a planned deep-sea port forms an essential ele-
ment of the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ). Kyaukphyu is located in Rakhine State, the 
epicenter of ongoing violence against the Rohingya people, where tensions remain high. Another 
planned SEZ is the Myitkyina Economic Development Zone which, when complete, will occupy ap-
proximately 2,000 hectares surrounding the Kachin State capital of Myitkyina (Sandhi Governance 
Institute 2019). The region is home to the Kachin Independent Organization (KIO), one of the coun-
try’s most powerful EAOs which has pursued federalism since the 1960s (Irrawaddy 2019). The KIO’s 
armed wing, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), regularly clashes with the Tatmadaw (Lei Mon 
2020). In northern Shan State, on the border with China, there is a third SEZ being developed in Muse 
whose surrounding area is affected by numerous local conflicts involving the Tatmadaw, EAOs, mili-
tias, and other government and armed group proxies (Asia Foundation 2017).
Most projects officially labelled as BRI projects are planned for areas with no active conflicts, 
but where marginalized groups are vulnerable and people nurture deep grievances. Concerns exist 
that Tatmadaw strongmen and Myanmar’s economic elites may benefit the most from new Chinese 
investments with economic benefits being distributed inequitably among the population (Lo 2019).
Ongoing subnational conflicts across the country are hard to ignore and questions have been 
raised about the viability of BRI projects before securing peace deals with EAOs (Lwin 2019). Violence 
has already been linked to the securitization of CMEC. In October 2020, for example, the Tatmadaw 
conducted a military operation intended to “provide security” for CMEC-related projects along the 
Mandalay-Lashio highway. Local human rights analysts suggest that the operation included indis-
criminate shelling, torture, looting and destruction of property in the southern Kyaukme township 
(Shan Human Rights Foundation 2020).
While potential threats to the safety and security of Chinese workers are of concern to Chinese of-
ficials, the safety and security of affected communities are often missing from the official discourse. 
Statements from Chinese government officials often assert that increased economic development 
linked to BRI projects will inevitably lead to peace. However, the root causes of conflict in Myanmar 
go beyond ‘underdevelopment’, with multifaceted subnational conflict dynamics varying by context 
and by group – ethnic, religious, gender and generational –, meaning that no such one-size-fits-all 
response will be effective (Asia Foundation 2017).
China has not been averse to greater political involvement in this complex context, despite its 
official policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Historical and cultural ties 
with ethnic groups across the border have enabled China to bring some of Myanmar’s EAOs – in par-
ticular, the KIA, the United Wa State Army, and the Kokang Army (Sun 2017) – to the negotiating table. 
During the 2010s, Myanmar’s government generally employed a cautious approach to Chinese in-
vestment as a result of a number of issues including debt, the environment and social instability. For 
example, the suspension of the Myitsone dam in 2011 came in response to widespread opposition 
to the project, not only from potentially affected communities but also from elites residing in Central 
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Myanmar (Sze Wan Chan 2017). Concerns focus on the environmental and social impacts that the 
dam may have on downstream communities in the Ayeyarwady River basin – including flooding, 
mass land confiscation and displacement (BBC 2019). Despite these concerns, Chinese investors 
continue to lobby for the unpopular project to be restarted under the framework of the BRI (Lo 2019).
Previous research suggests that infrastructure projects associated with the BRI have the poten-
tial to negatively affect up to 24 million people in Myanmar as river-related infrastructure develop-
ment, deforestation, and changing land use could lead to sedimentation, water pollution and the 
devastation of livelihoods (Helsingen et al. 2017). Under the leadership of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, 
Naypyitaw made efforts to implement a stronger investment regulatory framework. Under the 2018 
Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan (MSDP) large-scale infrastructure projects are expected to 
go through standardized sustainable business processes and procedures that meet international 
standards. However, civil society analysts question whether or not a centralized decision-making 
model – such as the MSDP – can ever be effective in tackling the many challenges linked to BRI 
investment as such a model excludes engagement with local communities (Zhou 2019). Mounting 
pressure from Beijing to make concessions to ensure faster progress on long-planned BRI projects 
has been seen as threatening Myanmar’s sense of political agency, which some analysts believe 
could “stoke public anger”, trigger protests and force through projects that are conflict in-sensitive 
(International Crisis Group 2020).
While supporters and critics of Chinese investment in Myanmar have long existed across all sec-
tions of society, including within government, civil society and local communities, recent interviews 
help us to understand more about the opportunities and concerns associated with the BRI in Myan-
mar from the perspective of local civil society.
As BRI initiatives begin to unfold, there is hope that projects will lead to more job opportunities for 
local people, access to money will increase, local economies will recover from the damage caused by 
the Covid-19 pandemic and GDP will grow.19 Residents located close by Kyaukphyu are hopeful that 
new roads and microfinance projects linked to the BRI could help progress local livelihoods.20 Many 
of Myanmar’s small to medium-sized business actors, including traders, also look positively on the 
BRI in the expectation that the terms of trade between Myanmar and China will improve (Mark et al. 
2020). However, while the BRI has created new economic opportunities for local communities and 
businesses in Myanmar, important conflict-related issues have also come to light.
As noted by a local expert, armed conflict in northern Shan State has expanded gradually over 
the last five years, spreading to more townships, all of which are connected to BRI projects in some 
way.21 All interviewees predict that if BRI infrastructure projects pass through conflict-affected areas, 
then further conflict is unavoidable. One contributing factor towards this prediction is that more se-
19   Interview with a local research consultant on private sector investment in Myanmar, 4 December, 2020.
20   Interview with a Yangon-based expert on China in Myanmar, 19 November, 2020.
21 Interview with an expert on Chinese infrastructure investment in Shan State, 16 November, 2020.
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curity will be needed to protect BRI investments, leading to increased militarization.22 Concerns exist 
that EAOs, or state-backed militias, could be transformed by their potential involvement with certain 
BRI projects, financially strengthening them and leading to the evolution of more armed groups, com-
petition, rivalry and more unwanted conflicts.23
CMEC is seen as China’s vision for the region, rather than policy designed in response to the spe-
cific concerns and priorities of Myanmar’s people (McCarthy 2020). Project plans are commonly per-
ceived as being devised by Chinese companies, which do not pursue initiatives to help prevent or ad-
dress the causes of conflict and lack sufficient understanding of complex environments.24 Owing to a 
deficit of accessible and transparent information, there is a common lack of understanding over what 
constitutes a BRI project and what falls under the category of more generalized Chinese investment 
in Myanmar.25 This has led to confusion, the spread of misinformation, and contributed towards an-
ger among communities at the lack of inclusion in decision-making.26 It is commonly presumed that 
benefits will inevitably be shared unequally, mainly among elites and members of the Tatmadaw.27
In Kachin State, people perceive that Chinese workers are more likely to receive jobs over local 
workers.28 According to one interviewee, as Chinese companies are more likely to win BRI tenders, 
local companies are increasingly seeking to merge with Chinese companies in the hope of obtaining 
more work, leading to concerns that this might continue the trend of Chinese workers being hired.29 
In Rakhine State, workers of Bamar ethnic origin are perceived as receiving higher salaries than work-
ers from other ethnic communities, exacerbating pre-existing tensions.30 BRI projects in Myanmar are 
seen to offer few openings for women as it is assumed that the majority of jobs will be given to men 
due to the physical nature of construction work.31 At all levels, women are not seen as being involved 
enough in BRI project planning, leading to accusations of gender-insensitive design and implemen-
tation.32
While efforts are being made to demonstrate increased transparency over project tenders via 
the creation of the online platform “Project Bank” (Clapp 2020), a general lack of clear information 
related to the BRI leaves communities feeling ill-informed. This has led to increased anxiety among 
affected residents who fear they might be forced to leave their land or give up their livelihoods when 
22   Interview with a local research consultant on private sector investment in Myanmar, 4 December, 2020.
23   Interview with a civil society leader based in Rakhine State, 19 November, 2020.
24   Interview with a civil society representative from northern Myanmar, 23 November, 2020.
25   Interview with an expert on Chinese infrastructure investment in Shan State, 16 November, 2020.
26   Interview with an expert on Chinese infrastructure investment in Shan State, 16 November, 2020.
27   Interview with a civil society leader based in Rakhine State, 19 November, 2020.
28   Interview with a civil society leader based in Rakhine State, 19 November, 2020.
29   Interview with a civil society leader based in Rakhine State, 19 November, 2020.
30   Interview with a Yangon-based expert on China in Myanmar, 19 November, 2020.
31   Interview with a civil society representative from northern Myanmar, 23 November, 2020.
32   Interview with a civil society representative from northern Myanmar, 23 November, 2020.
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their farmlands are taken from them, a move made easier by the “Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Land 
Management Law” of 2012, which offers residents – particularly women – little protection from land 
grabs.33 For those who are offered compensation for their land, it is often perceived as being at a 
lower price than the land is worth, and there have been cases of land confiscation associated with 
the BRI, mostly linked to the creation of the three planned SEZs.34 Civil society representatives predict 
that there will be more grievances related to land, driven by the perception that the government does 
not have the financial resources to provide compensation, fuelling concerns that more land might be 
confiscated.35
Although the Myanmar government has, on occasion, acted to ensure that environmental and 
social impact assessments (ESIAs) are included as part of Chinese investment agreements, they 
are not always independently conducted, have neglected civil society from consultations and have 
failed to prevent detrimental environmental and social impacts in the past.36 According to a human 
rights organization based in northern Myanmar, consultations between Chinese investors and some 
local communities likely to be impacted by specific BRI projects have reportedly taken place but with 
mixed results.37 For example, when communities were engaged in relation to the SEZ near Myitkyina, 
Chinese investors are reported to have explained very little about the project to affected villagers, 
making negotiations difficult and unclear.38 Such experiences fuel suspicion among local communi-
ties that consultations are intentionally opaque due to perceived company concerns that the better 
informed people are, the more likely they are to object or to protest.39
While the long-term implications of the military seizure of power remain unknown, for the BRI 
to be successful in Myanmar, all actors involved must better understand the multitude of factors 
related to existing subnational conflict. If China becomes closer associated with the Tatmadaw, it 
will likely further erode people’s confidence in the BRI. The assertion that economic development 
alone can lead to reconciliation is overly simplistic and the concerns and priorities of specific com-
munities, particularly women and other marginalized and minority groups, must be accounted for 
to ensure truly conflict-sensitive project design and implementation so that projects go beyond do-
ing no harm and contribute towards peace dividends. Affected communities are currently not being 
given the right to free, prior and informed consent regarding BRI projects and previous attempts at 
consultation have come across as tokenistic or ineffectual. Without a shift in the policies and prac-
tices of Chinese investors, it is likely that Myanmar’s hesitancy towards Chinese investment will 
continue. While it remains to be seen how willing China is to become more involved in the stalled 
33   Interview with a Yangon-based expert on China in Myanmar, 19 November, 2020.
34   Interview with a civil society representative from northern Myanmar, 23 November, 2020.
35   Interviews with a Yangon-based expert on China in Myanmar, 19 November, 2020 and a local research consultant on 
private sector investment in Myanmar, 4 December, 2020.
36   Interview with a civil society leader based in Rakhine State, 19 November, 2020.
37   Interview with a civil society representative from northern Myanmar, 23 November, 2020.
38   Interview with a civil society representative from northern Myanmar, 23 November, 2020.
39   Interview with a civil society leader based in Rakhine State, 19 November, 2020.
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peace process, the BRI has opened up a central opportunity for China which, if taken, could have 
significant implications for peace and security in Myanmar.
6. a SkeptICal neIghBor: perCeptIonS of ChIneSe InveStmentS In  
 kyrgyzStan
Kyrgyzstan is a key part of China’s overland ‘belts’ connecting Europe and Asia. The country is often 
referred to as an “island of democracy” in an authoritarian region, with a strong civil society. Since in-
dependence in 1991, it has also been the scene of political turbulence and domestic ethnic strife. Vio-
lent upheavals took place in the ethnically diverse southern part of the country in 2010 when clashes 
broke out between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, leaving scores dead and many more displaced and in-
jured (Pannier 2020). Decades-long cross-border confrontations between communities and security 
forces in the Ferghana Valley, where the borders of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan converge, 
are also common – mainly over disputed territory and the use of scarce land and water resources 
required for local livelihoods, and exacerbated by national and ethnic identity. Abusive and corrupt 
practices by the authorities can also enflame tensions and mistrust.
Over the past two decades, China has become a major player in Central Asia, mostly in the eco-
nomic sphere where it has largely supplanted Russia. China’s investments have steadily increased 
since the announcement of the BRI in 2013. While none of these investments are ‘officially’ tied to 
the BRI, many fall under its umbrella (Mogilevskii 2019). In 2019, nearly half of the Kyrgyzstan govern-
ment’s debt was held by the Export-Import Bank of China (BBC 2019).
While government-to-government loans have declined recently, FDI from private and Chinese 
state-owned enterprises continues to flow – often in coordination with local Kyrgyzstani ventures – 
largely into mining and oil (van der Kley 2020). As of 2020, the metals industry had received over 79% 
of all FDI in the country, over ten times the next largest sector – building and construction materials 
(7.1%) (OECD 2020). The Chinese government had previously financed several transport and energy 
connectivity projects as concessional loans, but these have largely given way to smaller grants.
Chinese investments bring jobs to communities (although the proportion of local to Chinese 
workers remains a point of contention, as do differences in pay). They can also bring training and 
skills-building programs, and Chinese language tuition.40 Better roads and transport links help move 
goods and facilitate new business,41 including the opening of local shops. While men tend to be hired 
for the hard labor in mining or refining, women can find opportunities (often better paid than normal) 
as cooks, cleaners or sometimes as liaisons between communities and companies.42 Despite mul-
tiple regime changes, most parliamentarians and high-level officials remain supportive of Chinese 
40   Interview with a researcher and journalist focused on China in Central Asia, November 10, 2020.
41   Interview with a Kyrgyzstan-based peace and security adviser, November 17,2020.
42   Interview with an academic expert on the political economy of Central Asia, December 3, 2020.
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investments, which they see as a crucial source of revenue, infrastructure development, or personal 
enrichment.43 Chinese money and investments are also welcome due to the lack of conditionality 
and a willingness to play by local rules. In fact, many projects are launched on the initiative of the 
Kyrgyzstan government or local businesses, which then seek funding from China.44 But given the un-
popularity of many officials and a lack of trust in authorities, the approval by national or local officials 
hardly translates into greater public support.
Despite its rising economic role, China is widely mistrusted by the public, with polls showing 
that Russia still enjoys greater support due its historical, economic and security ties (Laruelle/Royce 
2020). Between 2018 and 2020, there were reportedly 42 rallies and protests in Kyrgyzstan that were 
related to China (Oxus Society 2020).
Several projects – either funded by Chinese government loans or by FDI from Chinese private 
ventures – have gained widespread notoriety. After the completion of a 386 million USD project to 
modernize a Bishkek thermal power plant, a malfunction during the winter of 2018 left residents in 
the capital without heating – leading to accusations of corruption that ended with a former Prime 
Minister and other officials sentenced to lengthy prison terms (Fergana News Agency 2019). Most 
recently, following the political upheaval in October 2020, local residents seized several mining facili-
ties, expelling, in some cases, managers and Chinese workers (Shaku 2020).
Some local communities believe China is attempting to grab Kyrgyzstan’s land, which is re-
inforced by narratives of historical disputes over land and concern over ‘debt traps’. Investments are 
seen as an attempt by China to gain footholds abroad to increase its influence, and to ensure for-
eign support for some of its policies, for example in Xinjiang.45 The ‘expansionist’ role of China, it is 
argued, means that Kyrgyzstan has limited autonomy in the face of the colossal neighbor’s political 
influence and economic might.
Many believe that investments are intended to benefit China and local elites, but not local com-
munities, especially women and marginalized groups, who have less of a say and receive fewer 
bene fits. Chinese workers being paid more for the same work, or money going to corrupt officials, 
are cited as examples of this.46 Transport links that avoid major towns or settlements, bring few 
benefits to communities.47 For example, Kyrgyzstan’s south would play a largely transit role in the 
long-discussed China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, with few benefits for communities located 
along the route (Roberts 2019). The limited interaction between communities and Chinese workers 
has led to an increase in xenophobic attitudes towards Chinese people, with protestors demanding 
43   Interview with an academic expert on Russia and China in Central Asia, December 2, 2020.
44   Interview with a researcher and journalist focused on China in Central Asia, November 10, 2020.
45   Interview with a Kyrgyzstan-based peace and security adviser, November 17, 2020.
46   Interview with an expert on China in Central Asia, November 12, 2020.
47   Interview with an academic expert on the political economy of Central Asia, December 3, 2020.
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allegedly illegal Chinese immigrants to be deported or an end to marriages between Kyrgyz and 
Chinese people (Imanaliyeva 2020).
Perceptions of China and Chinese investments can vary substantially depending on factors such 
as employment, social status, age or gender – all of which help determine how impacts are felt. 
Views can also vary depending on the stage of development of specific projects. For example, where 
projects have reached an advanced stage, communities are said to know what to expect, as opposed 
to projects in the scoping or exploratory stage, where things are more uncertain and viewed with sus-
picion.48 Media reporting plays a role, too – in Russian-speaking communities where there is greater 
proliferation of Russian language news, people have different perspectives from those where infor-
mation is shared informally on social media in local languages. Rumors and dubious media reports 
can fuel existing grievances or perceptions. Covid-19, for example, has led to growing misinformation 
and distrust of China, further entrenching opposition to Chinese investments.49 Although, this has 
been somewhat mitigated by China’s support for Central Asia during the pandemic.50
Effects of Chinese investments on livelihoods vary substantially. Some projects provide jobs 
and training, with a large local labor force feeling the benefits. However, this can create resentment 
amongst community members who are not hired. For example, in the Jalal-Abad province’s Ala- Buka 
village, we heard how those in the center of the town benefited from jobs linked to the Full Gold 
Mining Company deposit, while those living further out felt they were neglected, leading to stronger 
anti-Chinese sentiments. Many Kyrgyzstani workers compare their pay or benefits to those of Chi-
nese laborers, who are often brought in because of their specialized skills or project management 
experience. In some mining sites, artisanal and small-scale miners who once gathered gold or other 
minerals close to the surface have now been squeezed out due to increased mining operations by 
Chinese companies.
The environmental impacts of Chinese projects have been a source of anti-Chinese protests. 
Some local residents, especially farmers and herders, claim to have been negatively impacted by 
pollution. They argue that their land has been contaminated by mines or refineries. Although social, 
environmental and economic impact assessments are almost never carried out at any stage of the 
projects,51 some interviewees mentioned that some companies, such as Kichi Charaat in Chatkal 
district, over time have developed a more collaborative approach with local workers, listening to their 
needs and tailoring their social packages accordingly.52 In gold mines like Salton-Sary, which have 
seen violent clashes between communities and Chinese workers (KABAR 2019), cases of contami-
nation of rivers and loss of livestock and crops are frequently cited in nearby settlements, although 
there has been limited corroborating evidence released. In Bishkek, the heat and power plant, which 
48   Interview with a Kyrgyzstan-based peace and security adviser, November 17,2020.
49   Interview with an academic expert on Russia and China in Central Asia, December 2, 2020.
50   Interview with an expert on China in Central Asia, November 12, 2020.
51   Interview with an expert on China in Central Asia, November 12, 2020.
52   Interview with a Kyrgyzstan-based peace and security adviser, November 17, 2020.
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failed in 2018, is based on coal usage and is thus seen as a ‘non-green’ project that contributes to the 
city’s serious pollution problem.53 Across the country, state inspections are repeatedly carried out, 
but there is little public trust in them.54 In some cases, Chinese companies have paid compensation 
but this has done little to allay concerns or resolve grievances.
Corruption, or perceptions of it, is a factor that tarnishes the reputation of local officials as well 
as Chinese investors. While the Chinese-funded renovation of the Bishkek thermal power plant pro-
vides a high-profile case study where politicians were allegedly involved in corruption, the interviews 
suggest this is not unique. Many of the deals struck between Chinese companies and local deci-
sion-makers are opaque and closed to public scrutiny, lending themselves to accusations of corrupt 
dealings that benefit elites. This is compounded by the Chinese companies’ preference to deal ex-
clusively with government officials, without engaging civil society directly. When Chinese companies 
have disputes with communities, they are perceived to work with local officials in the first instance 
and then escalate to higher-level officials in the province capitals or Bishkek rather than engage di-
rectly with those affected.55 This solidifies public perceptions that the benefits of such projects are 
intended for a select few, and not for residents.
Isolation and securitization of Chinese companies and workers also enflame tensions. Chinese 
workers have their own compounds and live separately from communities in the project locations, 
with Chinese private security companies providing protection (Yau/van der Kley 2020). Security com-
panies hired to protect Chinese workers from “hostile populations” only increase the disconnect with 
local communities who feel a growing sense of militarization, insecurity and even “occupation” of 
their lands.56 Sometimes Chinese workers are perceived as acting ‘superior’ to local people, hiring 
their own drivers, translators, cooks and cleaners, which can be seen as disrespectful of residents 
who wish to share in some of the more prestigious and better paid positions.57
A pervasive trust deficit also affects the role of civil society organizations (CSOs). There are sus-
picions as to why CSOs – especially international entities – would want to get involved in ‘internal’ 
or national matters, unless they represent the interests of foreign powers.58 Both the Kyrgyzstan 
government and Chinese companies therefore prefer to keep third parties out of the equation, mean-
ing that no one benefits from the expertise CSOs offer on specific issues, including those related to 
responsible and sustainable investment and ensuring local buy-in and engagement.59
53   Interview with an academic expert on Russia and China in Central Asia, December 2, 2020.
54   Interview with a researcher and journalist focused on China in Central Asia, November 10, 2020.
55   Interview with an academic expert on the political economy of Central Asia, December 3, 2020.
56   Interviews with a Kyrgyzstan-based peace and security adviser, November 17, 2020, and an expert on China in Central 
Asia, November 12, 2020.
57   Interview with a researcher and journalist focused on China in Central Asia, November 10, 2020.
58   Interview with a Kyrgyzstan-based peace and security adviser, November 17, 2020.
59   Interview with an academic expert on Russia and China in Central Asia, December 2, 2020.
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Chinese investors and the government in Kyrgyzstan face an uphill battle in getting public support 
for Chinese investments. Considering the strong opposition to their presence, many investors may 
decide it is not worth it and shift their focus to other Central Asian countries, or focus on soft power 
– for example, by providing support in responding to the Covid-19 crisis. However, for any continued 
investments, both sides will need to rethink their approach by closely considering the impact on lo-
cal communities, including the variable impacts on women and other marginalized groups, and by 
considering a more transparent, inclusive and responsive way of working with the public across all 
stages of the project.
7. the eaSt afrICan Belt: BrI InveStmentS In landloCked uganda
Since gaining independence from Great Britain in 1962, Uganda’s politics and society have been 
marked by North-South divisions and tensions causing conflict. Historically, the root cause of the 
problem can be found in a mixture of colonial legacy as well as by ethnic and religious divisions 
(Lwanga-Lunyiigo 1987). Since 1986, the Ugandan government – under the leadership of President 
Yoweri Museveni – has shaped Uganda’s political landscape, bringing relative stability and economic 
prosperity to the country (BBC 2018). However, socio-economic and political exclusion by ethnicity 
and location continues to have a destabilizing impact and is a catalyst for political conflict (Safer-
world 2020).
In 1987, following the signing of a major bilateral economic cooperation agreement between Ugan-
da and China (Obwona et al. 2007), Chinese companies began to invest in infrastructure – main-
ly constructing houses, roads and bridges. Since then, the volume of Chinese investment has in-
creased significantly. The discovery of oil deposits in 2006, predominantly in Uganda’s northern and 
north-easterly regions, has further accelerated an inflow of investments from China. However, poor 
natural resource governance has led to a rapid increase in land and natural resource disputes, es-
pecially in the north of the country. Land ownership, a major cause of tension and violence, has a 
history of changing borders and boundaries to suit political interests, often resulting in displacement 
or denial of people’s rights (Saferworld 2021).
The Ugandan population is young and growing rapidly. In 2019, 46.5% of people were under the 
age of 14 (Statista 2020). While government policies have spurred the country’s economic growth, 
they have only had a low impact on job creation, with analyses suggesting that there are only enough 
formal employment opportunities available for around a tenth of the 700,000 young people who 
reach working age every year (Economist 2021). This growing trend, coupled with a rise in the cost of 
living, is a major source of resentment for young and disenfranchised people who, despite increas-
ing government restrictions on freedom of expression (CIVICUS 2018) have begun to express their 
grievances more forcefully.
In 2018, Uganda signed a memorandum of understanding to join the BRI. It is estimated that the 
total sum of BRI investments and Chinese contracts in Uganda amount to roughly 1.8 billion USD 
(Scissors 2019). Major BRI projects include: a 480 million USD expansion of Entebbe airport by China 
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Communications Construction Corporation (CCCC), which is also building a toll road between the air-
port and Kampala; two large scale hydropower plants at Karuma and Isimba – both backed by loans 
from China’s EXIM Bank; and a number of rail and road construction projects (Wingo 2019).
The majority of China-backed public infrastructure projects in Uganda come in the form of gov-
ernment-to-government bilateral development support, with major projects proposed and endorsed 
centrally.60 The Ugandan government has expressed a strong preference for Chinese investment as a 
major source of infrastructure finance over western sources of investment because of China’s stated 
lack of interference in the internal affairs of other countries (Kynge 2014). Chinese finance has there-
fore been seen as a crucial avenue through which to plug the country’s infrastructure gap without 
inviting criticism of the Ugandan government’s more illiberal policies.
From recent interviews with Ugandan civil society representatives, it is widely acknowledged that 
Chinese infrastructure investment projects have the potential to create significant economic bene-
fits for Ugandans, as a result of better connectivity, improved local infrastructure and the creation of 
new business opportunities.61 A local land use consultant suggested that Chinese investments have 
created new business opportunities for local investors, for example in wood production, ecotourism 
and the health sector.62 Larger-scale projects, such as the China-Uganda Agricultural Industrial Zone 
– funded by the Kehong Group and estimated to be worth 220 million USD (Oluka 2016) – are predict-
ed to boost local agricultural output and increase the value of Uganda’s exports including hides, oils
and seeds (Xinhua 2020).63
Some BRI projects have negatively impacted local environments. The construction of the Isim-
ba and Karuma dams, for example, reportedly increased erosion and flooding along the river Nile.64 
While environmental damage threatens livelihoods, it is women who most often bear the brunt of it as 
they occupy the majority of agricultural jobs that are adversely affected. This results in many women 
having to move back into the family home having lost their main source of income, therefore experi-
encing greater poverty.65 Men on the other hand, are deemed as being better able to seek alternative 
avenues for livelihoods by landing short-term employment opportunities more easily, especially in 
jobs that are more physically demanding, such as the construction of roads and hydropower plants.66 
Land is an important but sensitive resource for Ugandans which is considered essential for cul-
tural identity and for sustaining livelihoods (Saferworld 2021). However, land required for BRI project 
delivery is only occasionally acquired through official acquisition processes resulting in numerous 
60   Interview with a Ugandan Research Fellow and Lecturer, 22 November, 2020.
61   nterview with a Ugandan Research Fellow and Lecturer, 22 November, 2020.
62   Interview with a Ugandan environment and land use consultant, 7 December, 2020.
63   Interview with a Ugandan human rights, justice and accountability expert, 4 December, 2020.
64   Interview with a Ugandan human rights, justice and accountability expert, 4 December, 2020.
65   Interview with a Ugandan expert on conflict resolution, 1 December, 2020.
66   Interview with a Ugandan Research Fellow and Lecturer, 22 November, 2020.
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incidents of rights violations, including forceful evictions without compensation.67 According to a lo-
cal expert, land acquisitions can lead to increased tension within and amongst communities, and be-
tween communities, local governments and investors, as marginalized groups – especially in north-
ern Uganda – have shown an increasing willingness to defend their land and interests from investors 
and the government.68
Chinese investments have increased the demand for land that is needed to undertake infrastruc-
ture development, mineral exploration and excavation, urbanization and commercial agriculture (Xin-
hua 2018). Such increasing demand has a pervasive effect in raising the price of land located nearby 
BRI construction sites, such as the Mbale industrial hub – also known as Mile 5 – “leaving many 
Ugandan investors priced out of the market”.69 At the same time, in the proximity of BRI projects 
rent prices have gone up significantly, forcing some local residents to leave their homes in search of 
cheaper rent.70 In case of disputes over land acquisition, local owners can seek financial compensa-
tion but this avenue has its own limitations. According to a Kampala-based researcher, as Uganda is 
a patriarchal society, women – especially elderly women – risk having their limited bargaining power 
taken advantage of and can end up being cheated out of compensation altogether.71 Although litiga-
tion often seems like the only viable option for those adversely affected by land issues, many who 
pursue this path face delayed justice, as demonstrated by legal disputes from as far back as 2014 
still being fought out in court.72 Engaging in legal proceedings is therefore only for those who can 
afford it, which in turn tends to favor the upper strata of society.
While BRI investments have bolstered the development agenda of the Ugandan government, 
questions have been raised about the government’s lack of transparency and accountability, leading 
to increased public mistrust.73 Following accusations of backdoor lobbying by Chinese companies in 
relation to a contract to resurface the highway linking Kampala to Jinja (Daily Monitor 2019), allega-
tions of corruption were directed at the government over the awarding of the contract, leading to calls 
for greater transparency and accountability.74 The perception of corruption linked to BRI contract 
award processes is prevalent, particularly among local business communities. Ugandan companies 
that lose out on BRI project contracts blame this on local politicians’ systematic favoring of Chinese 
competitors, which is usually mandated under the BRI. Such perceptions exacerbate suspicion of 
corruption vis-à-vis relevant entities such as the Uganda National Roads Authority (UNRA) or city au-
thorities including the Kampala Capital City Authority.75
67   Interview with a Ugandan environment and land use consultant, 7 December, 2020.
68   Interview with a Ugandan expert on conflict resolution, 1 December, 2020.
69   Interview with a Ugandan Research Fellow and Lecturer, 22 November, 2020.
70   Interview with a Ugandan Research Fellow and Lecturer, 22 November, 2020.
71   Interview with a Ugandan Research Fellow and Lecturer, 22 November, 2020.
72   Interview with a Ugandan environment and land use consultant, 7 December, 2020.
73   Interview with a Ugandan expert on conflict resolution, 1 December, 2020.
74   Interview with a Ugandan human rights, justice and accountability expert, 4 December, 2020.
75   Interview with a Ugandan human rights, justice and accountability expert, 4 December, 2020.
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In 2019, Chinese investment in Uganda helped to create roughly 18,000 jobs (Mayers/Barungi 
2019). Given the high level of unemployment in the country, particularly amongst those aged between 
18 and 30, a rise in the number of jobs available has been welcomed by communities, especially 
those living nearby BRI project sites.76 While many Chinese companies responsible for the delivery of 
BRI projects operate with a majority Ugandan casual labor force – mostly over 95% (Mayers/Barun-
gi 2019) – poor working conditions, a lack of employment protections and the perception of unfair 
compensation have soured this positive development.77 During the construction of the Karuma Dam, 
there were reports of a significant number of injuries suffered by local workers due to a lack of per-
sonal protective equipment (PPE).78 Furthermore, it has been reported that some Chinese investors 
do not understand Ugandan labor law (Musoke 2020) and that Ugandan organisations focussing on 
workers’ rights are often ignored by Chinese companies.79 In response to this, in 2020 the Federation 
of Uganda Employers designed a program to help Chinese entrepreneurs to do business in Uganda 
more responsibly (Business and Human Rights Resource Centre 2020). Nonetheless, perceptions 
remain that Chinese companies prefer to prioritize project efficiency over social or corporate respon-
sibility.80
In recent years, the number of Chinese citizens living in Uganda has increased significantly. Atti-
tudes towards the large Chinese presence in Uganda are starting to shift and the Covid-19 pandemic 
has exposed a growing anti-Chinese popular sentiment in Uganda. Despite Chinese efforts to be 
seen as contributing to the Ugandan fight against Covid-19, reports of racism, xenophobia and dis-
crimination against Chinese nationals in Uganda increased in 2020 (Oryem 2020).
The BRI in Uganda has been welcomed at the highest levels of government despite growing pub-
lic dissatisfaction. While BRI infrastructure projects have brought new jobs and business opportuni-
ties, members of the public and the business community have no say in what projects are agreed, 
nor which companies are chosen to implement them. Issues related to land acquisitions and the 
environment negatively affect Ugandan communities the most intimately. Actors involved in the BRI 
must recognize the history of marginalization and conflict in Uganda, as well as the complexities and 
sensitivities of land ownership. All land required for projects must be acquired legally. People giving 
up their land must also be allowed to do so in a free, informed and consensual way and not forced, 
with compensation paid out at a controlled market price. Concerns over a lack of labor rights, loose 
contractual agreements with employees and limited attention paid to corporate social responsibility 
have also had a negative impact on local perceptions of BRI investments. Unless addressed, it is 
likely that frustrations will mount, potentially leading to the exacerbation of existing tensions, further 
discrimination and more violence.
76   Interview with a Ugandan Research Fellow and Lecturer, 22 November, 2020.
77   Interview with a Ugandan environment and land use consultant, 7 December, 2020.
78   Interview with a Ugandan expert on conflict resolution, 1 December, 2020.
79   Interview with a Ugandan expert on conflict resolution, 1 December, 2020.
80   Interview with a Ugandan environment and land use consultant, 7 December, 2020.
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8. ConCluSIonS
Across the four cases and regions covered here, the BRI’s impact on conflict settings appears to be a 
mixed bag. On the one hand, it is undeniable that it yielded valuable foreign investments and concrete 
projects that otherwise would have been difficult to realize in these countries, given their conflict his-
tory, political instability and scarcity of capital. Marked by a much higher risk acceptance than that of 
traditional sources, and often the only option available, Chinese BRI-related (and other) development 
finance has emerged as a highly important factor in conflict settings. The BRI’s core promise of long-
term developmental benefits cannot be assessed yet, but intermediate results across key categories 
like connectivity, power generation and industrialization are encouraging.
On the other hand, the distribution of these new resources has emerged as a major point of con-
tention, especially where differences run along existing conflict lines within societies. Benefits tend 
to accrue among elites and powerful constituencies, while already disadvantaged groups lose out. 
BRI projects are often implemented in line with national-level development plans and reflect the priori-
ties of central governments, while peripheral regions have fared much worse in making their voices 
heard. Major projects, like the Gwadar port or Muse-Mandalay railway line, have not been designed 
in consultation with local populations, and are sometimes pursued against their active resistance. 
Locally operating Chinese companies are not systematically encouraged to understand themselves 
as actors in a difficult political environment, but instead to segregate as much as possible and stick 
to the increasingly unrealistic notion of ‘noninterference’, often at the explicit direction of the Chinese 
government and local embassies. This precludes genuine engagement with local communities and 
where outreach is attempted, it is often perceived as a mere image-building exercise.
While all four cases present specific challenges, it is also possible to suggest practices that 
would have served to improve outcomes across all of them. The first of these is to understand local 
civil society actors as crucial stakeholders in a project, and to involve them in all phases of the project 
cycle, beginning with the earliest impact assessments. This is not just a way of strengthening local 
ownership, but would also help BRI contractors by gaining greater knowledge about local environ-
ments and trusted intermediaries for the dissemination of project-related information.
Second, Chinese corporations active in these settings should urgently strengthen their conflict 
analysis capabilities and strive to develop a more conflict-sensitive consciousness. Accurately un-
derstanding the complex environments in which they operate, and the ways in which their invest-
ments could worsen or ease tensions, is not just a question of social responsibility, but would also 
increase the safety and long-term viability of Chinese investments.
Third, the lack of transparency surrounding BRI projects has already been identified as a major 
issue in other studies, but takes on additional relevance in conflict settings with low levels of inter-
communal trust and governmental legitimacy. Opaque tender procedures and secrecy regarding 
the underlying loan agreements, as well as a focus on bilateral top-level negotiations shift the bur-
den to ensure a fair and sustainable BRI implementation squarely on to national political systems, 
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which are often unable to deliver this. Greater transparency, reliable information platforms, and 
independent oversight would be obvious ways of improvement.
Fourth, a greater focus on local livelihood issues would help with reducing grievances and re-
sistance against the BRI at this level. Projects that may make sense for national-level development 
schemes can have highly adverse, concentrated effects locally, with environmental damage, land 
grabbing and transitory or exploitative employment opportunities among the biggest issues. This is 
another problem best addressed through active outreach and consultation with civil society.
Most of these improvements will have to be negotiated between Chinese and local actors. As 
pointed out in the case studies, BRI project outcomes are heavily influenced, but not dictated by the 
Chinese side, and building a more inclusive and conflict sensitive BRI will be a joint task. Ideally, this 
should also involve international partners to a greater extent – development agencies that have ex-
perience with operating in fragile environments, researchers who are able to offer insights on conflict 
dynamics, and NGOs engaged in practical conflict sensitivity work. This will require an attitude shift 
on both sides: for China, a greater willingness to open the BRI up to scrutiny and participation from 
actors it cannot control; and for Western governments and other external actors, a focus on fact-
based, constructive engagement instead of reflexive rejection. In conflict settings that seek transition 
to more stable and prosperous societies, the BRI is already an important factor. Working towards 
better implementation should be a goal shared by all stakeholders.
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